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10272 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of facts so far as it relates 
to cireumstances surrounding the execution of the will 
i~ correct, but it is not complete. 
At the same time the will under consideration was 
Pxecuted, Nettie Knudsen Miller, the testator's wife, 
made and executed her own last will and testament in 
\I hi ch slw devised and bequeathed all of her property 
to her husband, Miles E. Miller. The two wills bear the 
sa11w date, were obviously written on the same typewriter 
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and are witnessed by the same individuals. She revoked 
this will after her husband's death. 
A few years prior to the execution of these wills, 
Miles conveyed to Nettie the home in which he and hi) 
first wife had lived and in which he and Nettie \n•re th~n 
living. 
The four-plex apartment was constructed by Miles 
with the aid of his eldest son. Nettie used the income 
from this property for her support and maintenanC(l, 
but she did not attempt to sell or dispose of it in her 
lifetime. It is this property which the plaintiffs claim 
to have an undivided interest in and title to. 
The decree of final distribution in the matter of th2 
estate of Miles E. Miller, deceased, was made and en· 
tered without notice of any kind to anyone. Neither did 
any one interested in the estate other than the petitioner 
waive notice of hearing upon the petition. It is purely 
an ex parte decree and is without any binding force or 
effect upon anyone except Nettie. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE vVIIJLCREATED AN IMPLIED TRrST 
IN FAVOR OF THE TESTATOR'S CHIL-
DREN WITH RESPECT TO ANY PROPER-
TY NOT CONSUMED OR DISPOSED OF BY 
HIS WIDOW. 
In the appendix to this brief we have set forth a 
copy of the will which forms the subject matter of tbe 
--
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present litigation. We contend that the devise to Nettie 
"of all my property" is not absolute but is restricted to 
tlw extent that any of such property which she did not 
eonsmne or dispose of in her lif etirne was to be divided 
e(1ually Jwtween the four children named. Such was the 
intention of the testator as expressed in the will and the 
law impli<>s a trust to give effect to that intention. As 
8tated in 1 Perry on Trusts and Trustees (6th Ed.) 
:;('C'. lU apprnwcl and applied by this court in Re 
T!c11·1 !f's Estate, 45 U. 98, 143 Pac. 124 at 126. 
"Implied trusts are those that arise when 
trnsts are not directly or expressly declared in 
terms, but the courts, from the whole transaction 
and the words used, imply or infer that it was the 
intention of the parties to create a trust. Courts 
seek for the intention of the parties, however in-
formal or obscure the language may be; and, if 
a trust can fairly be implied from the language 
used as the intention of the parties, the intention 
will be executed through the medium of a trust." 
The statute directs that, "A will is to be construed 
according to the intention of the testator. 'Vhere his 
intPntion cannot have effect to its full extent, it must 
haw c•ffpct as far as possible." Section 74-2-1 U.C.A. 
Hl:'i:L This is the cardinal rule of construction of wills 
and is the one to which the others must yield. Johnson's 
E'otutc, (J..1- Utah 114, 228 Pacific 748. Of course the 
intention must be ascertained from the language of the 
1rill, hut the ~words must be read in the light of the cir-
nm1stances under which they were written. Section 
1-±-2-2. 
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A subordinate rule of construction, but one which j, 
specifically applicable in this case is the one which ri·. 
quires that, "The words of a will are to receive an inter. 
pretation which will give to every expression some effo.1 
rather than one which will render any of the expression~ 
inoperative." Section 7 4-2-9. 
With these rules in mind we proceed to examine the 
will in controversy. 
As appellant says the testator was frugal in the 
use of language disposing of his property. This is not 
without significance as we shall point out later. All of 
his property is disposed of in a single sentence. In the 
first few words he devises to Nettie all of his property. 
If he had stopped at this point, there would be no ques-
tion but that the devise to Nettie would be absolute. 
But he did not stop there. He did not even end the 
sentence. Without pausing, he proceeded to qualify tl1e 
devise to Nettie. He qualified it by naming his childm 
as beneficiaries and segregating the "remainder of my 
estate" from all of his property. He says in effect that 
he gives all of his property to Nettie because he knows 
she will divide among his children any of his property 
which she does not use or dispose of. 
The words, "I know she will care for my children,'' 
obviously do not mean he knows she would support 
and maintain his children. When the will was drawn, all 
of the children were married and supporting themselves. 
Furthermore, Nettie could not support his children out 
of property which remained undisposed of at the time 
11 
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of her death, The words, "care for my children," obvious-
ly nwan to give to my children or divide among my 
children. rrhe words, "share and share alike," make 
C"ertain that some property is to be divided among the 
C'hildrl'n. 'l'he phrase "remainder of my estate, if there 
lw any," refers to any of the testator's property which 
Xettie did not use or dispose of in her lifetime. Since the 
t(·~tator indicates that the reason he gave all of his 
property to Nettie was that he knew she would divide 
equally among his children any of it that she did not con-
sume in her lifetime, the conclusion is irresistible that the 
tlPvise to Nettie is qualified to the extent that she was 
prohibited from disposing of any of the property after 
her dc•atlt. It is this qualification of the devise to Nettie 
that creates the implied trust in favor of the children. 
TlH· willl involved in Re Dewey's Estate, cited above, 
devised all of the rest, residue and remainder of the 
kstator's property of every kind and nature whatsoever 
to Hubbard 'l'uttle. This apparently absolute devise 
was followed by a provision which stated that it was the 
tPstator's desire that Tuttle distribute the remainder 
among the testator's nephews and nieces and to such of 
them and in such proportions as Tuttle should deem 
just and proper, his decision upon such matters to be 
final. This court properly invoked the statutory instruc-
tion that all of the language of the will must be given 
effect, if possible, and decided that Tuttle held the re-
mainder of the testator's estate in trust for his nieces 
and nephews. We quote from this opinion: 
"It is quite true that if we stop at the end 
of the first sentence of the bequest wherein the 
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residue of the property is disposed of, the Ian 
guage is sufficient to pass the whole n•siclu1· j,, 
the trustee, but we cannot stop at that point fut 
the reason that the testatrix did not do so. ~he 
proceeded further, and by what she said she crea-
ted a trust. Again, as we have already pointed 
out, if she did not intend to create a trm;t, 01t .. 
would not have made the bequest of the n•sidu .. 
of her property in the form it was made, but 
would have given the trustee all the residue in th1 
preceding paragraph of the will." 
1The only difficulty there can be in ascertaining the 
tsetator's intention in this case arises out of his u~e 
of the \Vord "know." Had he used the word "request,'' 
"desire," or "wish" our search for his intention would be 
ended. It is our contention that the word "know" is much 
less precatory than either of the suggested terms and 
that it is equivalent to a command to Nettie prohibiting 
her from diverting any property from the children by a 
testamentary disposition. The authorities are uniform 
in holding as this court did in Re Dewey's Estate, Supra 
that precatory language will be construed as mandatory 
if the testator intended to give that effect to it. 
In Colton vs. Colton, 127 U.S. 30, 8 S. <Ct. llGJ, 3'. 
L.Ed. 138, David Colton gave to his wife all of his estate, 
real and personal, of which he died seized or possesse<l 
or entitled to, but, "I recommend to her the care and 
protection of my mother and sister and request her to 
make such gift and provision for them as in her judgment 
will be best." The testator's sister sued the wife to re-
quire her to make provision for the sister out of th· 
estate. The Supreme ·Court of the United States hcl<l 
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that tlw wi 11 created a trust for the benefit of the testa-
trll''s si:-:ter. It cited numerous authorities and quoted 
11 itli ;ipproval from Briggs v. Penny, 3 Macn. & Gord. 
:-i-J.(i, 3:J+. 
"'I conceive the rule of construction to be 
that words accompanying a gift or bequest ex-
1iressive of confidence, a belief, or desire, or hope 
that a particular application will be made of such 
heqlwst, will be deemed to import a trust upon 
tlt(_•se conditions; first, that they are so used as 
to Hclude all option or discretion in the party 
\\"ho is to act as to his acting according to them 
or not; secondly, the subject must be certain; and, 
thirdly, the objects expressed must not be too 
vague or indefinite to be enforced.' The most 
rc>c(~nt declarations of the English courts of 
equity do not modify this statement of the law." 
In Warner cs. Bates, 98 l\Iass. 274, the testatrix's 
\1ill gan her husband a life estate in the entire income 
from lwr property "in the full confidence" that he will 
npun rny decease, as he has heretofore done, continue to 
g-ive and afford my children such support as either of 
them may stand in need of. The children ref erred to 
\l'l'l'l' not the children of the husband. One of them be-
(·a11w seriously in need of support and filed a bill in 
equity against the husband to require him to furnish 
that support out of the income from the testatrix's prop-
Prty. rrJie court ordered him to pay a monthly SUill 
to the need:v child. 
The opinion noted that it was the universal rule that 
'rnrd:o of entreaty, recommendation or wish addressed 
to a lrgatee will create a trust. 
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"If the objects of the supposed trust are cer-
tain and definite; if the property to which it j, 
to attach is clearly pointed out; if the relation' 
and situation of the testator and the supposed 
cestuis que trust are such as to indicate a stron" 
interest and motive on the part of the testato°J· 
in making them partners of his bountv · and . ' above all, if the recommendatory or precatorv 
clause is so expressed as to warrant the inferenc~ 
that it was designed to be peremptory on thP 
donee; the just and reasonable interpretation is, 
that a trust is created, which is obligatory and 
can be enforced in equity as against the truster 
by those in whose behalf the beneficial use of the 
gift was intended." 
Both the will and the surrounding circumstances now 
under consideration are closely analygious to those in 
Merrill vs. Pardun, 125 Neb. 701, 251 Northwestern 836. 
The testator gave to his wife "all of the residue and 
remainder of my property of whatever kind and wherr-
soever situated to be hers absolutely," but in the fol-
lowing sentence stated, "It is my request, however," 
that any of said property remaining at the death of his 
wife should go to his daughter and in case of her death 
then to her children, share and share alike. All of the 
property was distributed to the widow, but she had on 
hand at the time of her death some $8,000.00. The 
daughter, Margaret, brought suit to have this $8,000.00 
impressed with a trust for her benefit. The Supreme 
Court of Nebraska held that the daughter was entitled 
to this fund. In the course of a well considered opinion, 
it said: 
"In determining what the testator meant by 
the word "request," we have to take into consider-
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ation the situation of the parties at the time. The 
testator in this case was married a second time. 
He had no children of the second marriage, but 
he had one daughter by a former marriage. He 
desired to provide for his wife during her life-
time, and the necessary inference would be taken 
that he then desired that his property go to his 
blood relations. His daughter being his nearest 
of kin, he therefore made this bequest to his wife, 
and then requested that so much thereof as re-
mained at her death should be given to his daugh-
ter. The use of the word "request" in a dispo-
sition by will limiting an apparently absolute be-
quest to a widow does not imply that it is option-
al, discrtonary or recommendatory, particularly 
when the context of the will does not demonstrate 
an alternative choice or option in the pursuit of 
a recommendation or an exercise of discretion, 
but if it is definite as to a person and quantum 
of estate, if there was no clear discretion or choice, 
if the person benefited is a natural object of the 
testator's bounty, and if the person affected by 
the limitation is in close or fiduciary relation to 
the testator as a widow, the use of the word "re-
quest'' imports, although in courteous and polite 
form, a command or direction, imperative and dis-
positive in legal effect. It therefore is a bequest 
to his daughter, Mildred I. Merrill, or all property 
remaining on the death of his said wife, to be 
hers absolutely." 
In Tucker vs. Myers, 151 Neb. 359, 37 N.W. 2d, 585; 
the testator after making an absolute and unqualified 
devise to his wife stated that it was his desire that in 
the event she left no heirs of her body, that she make 
a will bequeathing the property "I leave her to my 
brothers and sisters to be distributed equally among 
those living at the time of her death." The Court said: 
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"(6) 'l'he gen0ral rulP in this statp is that. 
in construing a \Vill, wher0 the will in mw <'la 11 ,,, ' 
makPs an appan•ntly absolute be(1uc~:::;t of propertv, 
but a subsequent clause rnakvs a furth<'l' lwqu('~t 
of the remaindPr after thP death of the lPgall"' 
taking under the first clause, the two clausPs arr 
to be construed togPther to ascertain the true 
character of the estatP in fact granted by tlt<· firct 
clause; and in such case, contrary to the ancient 
rule at common law, the second clause is effrrtin 
and operates to define and limit the estate granted 
by the first as a life estate with pom•r of dispo-
sition, and the second is effective and orwrativ~ to 
grant an estate in remainder in the unused, un-
expended, or undisposed property granted for 
lifo by the first." 
In another case in which the testator gaw, devised 1 
and bequeathed to his wife all of his property, both ml, 
personal and mixed of whatever kind and nature soenr 
and wherever located, but proceeded to stak that if al 
the time of his wife's death there should be any property 
left, "it is my request that it be divided between my hrn 
children, George and .Mable, to share and shan~ alike," 
the court did not have any problem in ascertaining tlw 
testator's intention to be that these two children shoulJ 
share equally in any property that the wife had not con-
sumed. It said: 
" ( 5-7) In determining what the testator 
meant by the word "request," account should be 
taken of the relative situation of the parties, thr ' 
ties of affection subsisting between them, and 
the motives which would naturally influence tlw 
mind of the testator, as well as the existence ol 
a moral duty on his part toward the party 11hn 
will benefit from compliance with hi::; des1rr; 
--
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an<l n•conmiendations. l\Iorrison v. Tyler, 266 
Ill. :m~ 107 KE. !)02; Abrahams v. Sanders, 274 
111. .+:J~, l V{ KK 737. The fact that, in the event 
a trnst is declared, the person who will be bene-
fi tPd is a natural object of thP testator's bounty, 
is (•ntitled to strong consideration in determining 
whether the word ''request" or "desire" in a will 
imports a command. Cumming v. Pendleton, 112 
Conn. 5G9, 153 A. 175; l\Ierrill v. Pardun, 125 
NPb. 701, 251 N.W. 834. A construction which 
(•.onfonm;, as far as possible, to the Statute of 
DescPnt (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, c. 39) is to be pre-
frrred. Dahmer v. \Vensler, 350 Ill. 23, 182 N.E. 
79!!, 9-+ A.L.R. l; Smith v. Garber, 286 Ill. 67, 121 
N.K 173. Under tlwse principles, it was held 
in the Conneticut case, supra, that the word "de-
sire," and in the Nebraska case, supra, that the 
word ''rPquest," in a subsequent clause after a 
llI"PCeNling absolute devise, were intended to be 
words of command. 
''Another circumstance frequently held to in-
dicate that precatory expressions were intended 
to be mandatory is that the person to whom they 
were addressed is the spouse of the testator, to 
whom it is not to be expected that commands 
would be expressed in such forcible language as 
between strangers." 
':'i..P(• Keizer 1·s. Je11sc11, 3'73111.184, 25 N.E. 2d 819, 
The English authorities are in accord with the view 
that precatory language in a will may be construed as 
mandatory if it appears that the testator intended to 
n·~trict or qualify what would otherwise be an absolute 
lwqnest or devise. 
In Wilson 1:s. Mayor, 11 Ves. Jun. 205, 32 Eng. Re-
[Jrint 1066, the testator devised real property to his 
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wife "upon full trust and confidence'' that at her death 
she would make proper distribution to his children; ]i,,lu 
that upon the death of the wife the title vested in thi· 
children. 
In Massey 1.."S. Sherman, 27 Eng. Reprint 335, a de-
vise to the wife in fee with "no doubt but that my wife 
will dispose of the same to and amongst my childm 
as she shall please" was held to create a trust in favor 
of the children of the property remaining at the death 
of the wife. 
In Malin i:s. Keighley, 30 Eng. Reprint G59, tl11· 
English rule was said to be: "I will lay down the rule 
as broad as this; wherever any person gives property 
and points out the object, the property and the way in 
which it shall go, that does create a trust unless he shows 
clearly that his desire expressed is to be controlled by 
the party and that he shall have an option to defeat it.'' 
See also the following cases : 
Pierson 1.:s. Gamet, 39 English Reports 20. 
TVy1we 1.."S. Hau:kins, 28 Eng. R€print 1068. 
All of the points relied upon by appellants in tlwir 
brief deal with the legal effect of the decree of distri-
bution in the decedent's estate. Only incidental consider· 
ation is given to the provisions of the will. They do, 
however, interpret the will as devising an absolute and 
unqualified estate to Nettie. In this connection reliance 
is placed on Section 7-1:-1-36 which states that every de 
vise of land in any will conveys all of the estate of tli• 
--
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devisor therein which he could lawfully devise unless it 
<'!early ap1wars by the will that he intended to convey a 
IPss estate. 
The support afforded appellants by this statutory 
rule is extremely weak. It deals with quantity of estates 
rather than quality. No one would deny that the lan-
guage of the devise up to a certain point is legally suf-
ficient to convey to Nettie a fee simple title to the four-
plex property. But the testator was not devising legal 
titles; he was disposing of a parcel of land. The question 
with which we are concerned is not how much title was 
givPn to Nettie, but whether there were any conditions 
or qualifications imposed upon her power to dispose of 
the land. 
In any event the rule stated in 74-1-36 is subordinate 
and must yie Id to that set forth in 7 4-2-1. If the intention 
of the testator is discernible it will prevail and it is use-
less to indulge in degrees of clarity. A good analysis 
of the functions of these two rules of construction will 
he found in Colton vs. Colton, 127 U.S. 300, 8 S. Ct. 
1164, 32 L.Ed. 138. 
None of the cases relied upon by appellants involve 
testamentary situations sufficiently similar to those now 
under consideration to justify any specific comment. 
Wills may be compared to human faces in that no two of 
them are identically alike. Even if the language of the 
wills were the same, the difference in the surrounding 
circumstances under which each was drawn would be 
snfficient to distinguish them. Since it is the intention of 
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the te:::;tator with which we are dealing, every word a11d 
every ci rcurnstance has its own peculiar signifo:an~e. 
Not only the testator's words, but his lack of wonh; haw 
a bearing upon what he had in mind when he signed the 
instrument. 
Although the above observations apply to in Re Cal\, 
estate cikd in appellant's brief, we respectfully submit 
that it is erroneously decided. In our opinion it frui-
trates the testator's intention. It treats the will mi though 
the testatrix had devised legal concepts instead of the 
small home where she had spent her life and rpared Im 
family. Although it gives lip service to Section i-P~I. 
no use whatever is made of this rule. Actually the op 
inion is in the very t(~eth of this rule. It ignores fin 
full paragraphs of the will, each of which is plainly rlio-
pository in character and in which the nephew is specific-
ally named. 
·'l_'he opinion states that the appellant's argument 
is not without merit. This lack of confidence of the court 
in its own opinion is readily understandable. 
POINT II. 
THE DECREE OF DISTRIBF'l'ION IS JN 
AiCCORDANCE WITH THE TER~JS OF 
'fHE WILL AND DOES NOT CUT OFF 'rHE 
INTERESTS OF RESPOXDENTS IN Til~ 
PROPERTY. 
The petition of the executor for final distribution of 
the estate made the will a part of the pPtition by rrfer-
ence thereto and :::;tated that all of the property on hand 
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should he distributed according to the will to Nettie 
l\nudsc·n l\Lilh,r. The prayer of the petition was that 
the remainder of the estate be so distributed. 
It is of importance to note that no notice of any kind 
1rn~ given of the hearing upon this petition and no hear-
ing was ever held. None of the respondents were even 
mention<•d in the petition other than indirectly by the 
incorporation of the will by reference. On the same day 
the petition was filed the decree of distribution was en-
tered. This decree specifically provided that in accord-
anc with the last will and testament of the deceased, the 
entire residue and remainder of the estate of Miles Ed-
1rard l\Iiller, etc. is distributed and set over to Nettie 
Knudsc'n l\Iiller. In other words the terms of the will are 
made the terms of the decree. It follows that Nettie took 
nothing by the terms of the decree other than the inter-
ests which were devised to her under the will. 
lt likewise follows from these considerations of the 
decree that it did not impair or affect the interest of the 
plaintiffs in the four-plex property. Since the distributon 
was in accordance with the terms of the will, the implied 
trust created by the will was in no way affected by the 
rlrcrre and there is no occasion for the plaintiffs to at-
tack it either collaterally or directly. 
Plaintiffs admit that the will gave Nettie the full 
use and enjoyment of the property during her lifetime 
and that she had also the power to dispose of it in her 
lifetime. The only restriction upon her title was that she 
was prohibited from disposing of it by will or other testa-
iuentary disposition. 
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Title to real estate in Utah vests upon the death of 
the testator in the devise:,; designated in the will. The 
probate court is without jurisdiction to distribute or 
divide the property contrary to the provisions of the 
will. It cannot divest a devisee of his interest in thi· 
property nor can it award the interest of one devisee tu 
another. The only jurisdiction which the probate court 
has is to administer the estate of the decedent in order 
that creditors may be satisfied, taxes paid and funeral 
expenses di:,;charged. 
It is true, of course, that we do not have in thi:,; Stafr 
probate courts as such. Probate jurisdiction is exercised 
by the di:,;trict courts. It would be more accurate to d~­
scribe the probate court as a division of the district court. 
In this situation the only matter of substance to be con-
sidered i:,; the due process clause of our constitution. Tf 
a controversy arises in the probate proceedings and the 
parties are given proper notice and an opportunity to he 
heard, they will be bound by the judgment rendered, re-
gardless of the division of the court which renders the 
decision. On the contrary if such notice has not been 
given and no opportunity to be heard has been afforded, 
the court can make no binding adjudication whether it 
sits as a probate court or as a court of general jnrisdic 
ti on. 
So far as the present controversy is concerned, thcrr 
is nothing in the petition for distribution which even 
intimated that the petitioner 'ms seeking any judgment 
or decree that would adversely affect or impair the plain-
tiffs' interests under the will of their father. 'l'he prayer 
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of the petition was that the property be distributed as 
provided by the terms of the will. 'The plaintiffs were 
not mentioned in the petition and their rights under 
the will were not assailed or attacked in any way. No 
notice of any kind or character was given to any of the 
plaintiffs or anyone else. The decree was entered im-
mediately upon filing the petition. To construe it as 
cutting off the plaintiffs' interests in the property as 
appellants contend that it did, is to ignore the constitu-
tion as well as elementary rules of pleading. 
Although this court has rendered conflicting deci-
sions with respect to the integrity of decrees entered 
in course of probate of decedent's estates (See In Re 
Rices Estate, 111 Utah 428, 182 Pac. 7, 111) there has 
hPen no departure from the proposition declared by 
J uclge Wolfe in his concurring opinion in McLaren v. 
JlcLaren, 99 Utah 340, 106 P. 2d 766. He stated: 
"The case is different where the court has 
proceeded to hear the issues and render judgment. 
In such cases where the allegations are sufficient 
to invoke the proper jurisdiction and to present 
the issues cognizable within the jurisdiction which 
should be invoked and the parties are served in a 
manner to bring them under that jurisdiction, 
there seems to be no reason why the label given 
the the action in the caption should control. I 
think the law in Utah is now clearly to the effect 
that if the above requirements are met the matter 
will be considered as having been addressed to the 
side of the court to which it should have been ad-
dressed, and actions taken by the court in the 
matter will be considered as having been taken in 
pursuit of the authority it exercises when func-
tioning in that capacity. The matter of a change 
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of cavtion or a redocketing of the case or of the 
procr>edings is a rnattE•r which may be adju:-;h·rl 
ministerially. 
''But again, warning should be soundPd l'P-
garding the situation wlwre a civil case is triPrl 
as a probate "matter and probate matter tried a~ a 
civil casP when they are respectively purely rnat-
ters cognizable only as civil and as probate. It is 
onP thing to determint> a civil matter as a proLatP 
matter or a probate matter as a civil case and 
quite anothPr thing to try a probate matter as a 
probate matter and a civil case as a civil case, 
although they may be addressed to tlw wrong diri 
sions of the court. The first is a matter of sub-
stance; the second a matter of labels and minister-
ial adjustment." 
Appellants' reliance upon Auerbach vs. Samuels is 
not well placed. The bequest of ~Ir. Auerhadt to hi.< 
sish•r \ms conditiom•d upon the net value of the estatl' 
being in Pxcess of a stated sum. This, of course, was a 
quPstion of fact. The petition for final distribution in 
effect alleged that the bequest to the sisters had failed 
and prayPd for a settlement of the account. Due notir~ 
of the }waring upon the petition was given to the sisters, 
but they failed to appear. The court determined that the 
net value of the estate was not sufficient to give vitality 
to the beqm~st to the sisters. This was a decision of a 
fact question necessarily involved in the probate of the 
estate and since the sisters had notice of the hearing and 
an opportunity to be heard, they were held to he bound 
by the decree. The case is not authority for the proposi-
tion urged by the ap1)ellants to tlw effect that the der1Tl' 
of distribution in the :Miller estate which adorited th 1• 
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terms of the will and which was entered without notice of 
any kind was in effect a decree quieting title in Nettie 
a()"ainst the adverse claims of the Plaintiffs. This decree 
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did not alter any of the terms of the will or the rights 
of any of the parties thereunder. It neither enlarged 
~ettie's interest nor diminished or cut off those of the 
children. 
There is nothing in the Utah Statutes referred to 
in the appellant's brief which precludes the plaintiffs in 
this case from asserting their title to the four-plex prop-
erty. They deal with the finality of probate decrees and 
collateral attacks upon them. Since the Miller decree 
distributed the estate in accordance with the terms of 
the will, it is immaterial to the Plaintiffs case whether it 
is final or vulnerable to any form of attack. 
CONCLUSION 
There can be no doubt that the testator intended that 
his children should have any of his property that his 
widow did not consume or dispose of in her lifetime. The 
only question presented is whether that intention has 
been made known by the words and phrases found within 
the four corners of the will. The respondents maintain 
that it has. This intention of the testator must be given 
effect by imposing a trust upon the four-plex property 
for the benefit of the children. 
The decree of distribution did not alter, impair or 
affect any of the terms, provisions or conditions of the 
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will and did not enlarge or diminish the interest of either 
tlw widow or the children. 
The case was correctly decided in the lower court 
and the judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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APPENDIX 
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF 
MILES EDWARD MILLER 
I, l\HLES EDWARD .MILLER, of the age of 55 
years, residing in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
being of sound and disposing mind and memory and not 
acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence 
of any person whomsoever, do make, publish, and declare 
thit', my Last Will and Testament, and do hereby express-
ly revoke all other and former Wills and codicils to 
Wills made by me. 
FIRST. I direct that all my just debts and funeral 
Pxpenses be paid as soon after my demise as conveniently 
can be dorn=~, and that I be buried with due regards to my 
station in life. 
SECOND. I give, devise and bequeath to my beloved 
wife, Nettie Knudsen Miller, all of my property, whether 
the same be real or personal or mixed, and I do this 
acknowledging all my children hereinafter named, and 
for the reason that I know that my beloved wife will, 
eare for my children from the remainder of my estate, 
if there be any, share and share alike : Miles Lorraine 
~Iiller, son; Irvine Bagley Miller, son; Viola Miller 
Carlsen, daughter; Zola Miller Smith, daughter; all 
l'esidents of the State of Utah. 
'rHIRD : I direct that should anyone prove a right 
to inherit from my estate, other than my immediate 
family, then and in that event, I direct that such person 
or pt>rsons shall receive from my estate the sum of One 
and no/ 100 ( $1.00) Dollar and no more; and I further di-
l'ect that should anyone whomsoever contest this my last 
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·will and 'l'estament, then and in that event, I direct that 
such person or persons shall al:oo receive from my estate 
the sum of One and no/100 ( $1.00) Dollar and no rnorP. 
FOURTH. I nominate and appoint my beloved wife , 
~ ettie KnudsPn l\liller, as the executrix of this, my last 
\Vill and 'l\-'t:>tm1wnt, and direct that she shall hav() all 
powers nPcessary or convenient for the performance of 
lwr duties without application to the Probate Court, and 
full po-vyer to give to the purchaser or purchm;ern or the 
beneficiaries under this, my last \Vill and Testament, all 
df~eds, bi lb of :oak', and other nrnniments of title that ma~­
be expedient or necessary in carrying out her dutiPs here-
under and I fmther direct that she shall act as such with-
out posting any bond whatsoevPr in carrying out my 
re<1uPsts. 
JN WITNESS -WHEREOF, I, 1\lILES EDWARD 
~11 LLER, the testator above named, have to this my la't 
Will and Testament, consisting of two pages of paper, 
hereunto subscribed my name and set my seal this 20 
day of _March, 1941. 
Miles Edward Miller 
Signed, sealed, published and declared by said testa· 
tor Miles Edward l\Liller as and for his last Will and ' - ' 
Testament, in the presence of us, who at his request, in 
his presence, and in the presence of each other, have 
hereunto subscribed our names at:> witnesses this 20 day 
of March, 19.U. 
Roscoe W. Irvine Residing at .Ul Felt Bldg., Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
Alonzo Mackay, residing at Salt Lake City, Ftah. 
